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MARKETS AND GAMES: A SIMPLE EQUIVALENCE AMONG
THE CORE, EQUILIBRIUM AND LIMITED ARBITRAGE
ABSTRACT
Graciela Chichilnisky*
Columbia University
(July 1994 : revised September 1995)
This note provides simple proofs of the equivalence among the core, equilibrium and limited
arbitrage in markets with short sales, and with uniform strictly convex preferences .
1 . INTRODUCTION
This note provides very short and simple proofs of the equivalence among
the core, competitive equilibrium and limited arbitrage. Limited arbitrage
is a condition defined on the endowments and preferences of the traders in
an Arrow Debreu economy; it was introduced in Chichilnisky (1991) and it
has an antecedent in Chichilnisky and Heal (1984).
The expression limited arbitrage is used to describe economies where
only bounded, or limited, gains are available to the traders at their initial
endowments . This means that there exists one price-the same for all
traders-at which affordable trades can only increase their utilities by
limited, or bounded, amounts. Limited arbitrage is related to, but
nonetheless different from, the concept of no-arbitrage used in finance,
see Chichilnisky (1992, 1995a).
The results in this note provide a very succinct and simple exposition
of part of a much larger and more complex area . I draw from earlier
* The Leif Johansen Award at the University of Oslo, and research support from NSF
grants No. 92-16028 & DMS 94-08798 contributed to the preparation of this paper. The
results of this paper were presented and circulated at an invited session of the American
Economic Association and also at a session of the Econometric Society Meetings in Boston,
January 3-5, 1994 . 1 thank the Associate Editor and two anonymous referees for very
helpful comments .
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results establishing for the first time a condition-limited arbitrage-
which is simultaneously necessary and sufficient for the existence of a
competitive equilibrium and for the non-emptiness of the core .
(Chichilnisky 1991, 1992, 1993a, 1994b) . I The simple proofs provided
here work only for economies with short sales (so that trades are in RN),
and when the preferences are convex, uniform and contain no half lines in
their indifferences, such as for example those which are representable by
strictly concave utilities . 2 It has been established that the equivalence
between limited arbitrage and the existence of an equilibrium holds in
great generality : it is true in markets with short sales, i.e . when X= RN
and also in the classic Arrow Debreu case when no short sales are
allowed 3 X= RN+ ; furthermore it holds also with finitely and with
infinitely many commodities.4 Limited arbitrage is also equivalent to the
non-emptiness of the core with short sales, and either finitely or infinitely
many markets, see also Chichilnisky and Heal (1991) . In general,
complex proofs are required. However by specializing on a simpler case,
when X = RN+ and uniform preferences with indifference surfaces which
contain no half lines, I can use known results in the literature5
Chichilnisky and Heal (1984, 1993), and offer proofs which are very
short and simple . Just a few lines suffice .
Section 4 shows that the no-arbitrage Condition C, introduced in 1984
by Chichilnisky and Heal (1984, 1993) in a paper which provided the first
proof of existence of a competitive equilibrium in Walrasian economies
with short sales, is also simultaneously necessary and sufficient for the
existence 'of a competitive equilibrium and for . the nonemptiness of the
core in the special cases considered in this paper. The relationship
between the results of Chichilnisky and Heal (1984, 1993) and the
Other literature is discussed in Chichilnisky (1992) and also below.
2 This excludes the classic Arrow Debreu model in which the trading space is R''+, and
preferences which are linear or have half lines in their indifferences . The results in
Chichilnisky (1991, 1992, 1993a, 1993b, 1994a, 1994b, 1995a, 1995b) include 118N+ and all
the preferences mentioned above .
3 See Chichilnisky (1991, 1992, 1993a, 1994b, 1995a) .
4 Chichilnisky and Heal (1984, 1993) .
E.g . the 1984 results in Chichilnisky and Heal (1984, 1993) which introduced a no-
arbitrage condition C and proved it is sufficient for the existence of an Arrow Debreu
equilibrium in markets with short sales (finite or infinite dimensional) . Subsequently,
existence results which are special cases of the above were given in Werner (1987), Nielsen
(1989), Page (1987), and Chichilnisky (1992) . The latter provides necessary as well as
sufficient conditions . Theorem 1 of Chichilnisky and Heal (1984, 1993) establishes the
existence of an equilibrium under this paper's conditions . See Proposition 4 of Section 4
below.
© Blackwell Publishers Ltd . 1996
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subsequent results in Werner (1987), Nielsen (1989) and Page (1987) is
also discussed in Section 4 .
In addition to market equilibrium and the core, the concept of limited
arbitrage is central to other forms of resource allocation : it is necessary
and sufficient for the existence of continuous anonymous social choice
rules which respect unanimity on preferences similar to those of the
traders (Chichilnisky 1993c, 1991) and for the elimination of Condorcet
cycles and a resolution of Arrow's impossibility theorem on choices of
large utility values (Chichilnisky 1994b, 1995a) . Limited arbitrage is
therefore a unifying condition which is crucial for the most frequently
used forms of resource allocation : by markets, games and social choice .
2. DEFINITIONS
An economy E has H :-:- 2 traders who trade n : 2 commodities or assets ;
the trading space X is RN+ . A trader i is described by an initial endowment
or property rights vector S2i in RN, and by a convex preference represented
by a utility function ui : RN -> Ifs, which is continuous and monotonically
increasing . Without loss of generality we may choose a quasiconcave utility
representation satisfying ui(0) = 0, and SUPXE RN (u(x)) = oc . A market
economy is E = {X S2i E RN+, ui : X-+ R, i = 1, . . ., H} . The trading
opportunities which could yield unbounded utility increases for the ith
trader are described by net trades in the global cone defined ash
A;(Q;) = {y E RN : `dx E 118N, 3A > 0: ui(Qi + Ay) > ui(x)} : this is a con-
cept originally introduced in Chichilnisky (1991) and (1992), and contains
global information about the trader. I make three assumptions on
preferences, b' is
(1) non-satiation: A ;(52 ;) * 0 ;
(2) uniformity : the smallest closed set containing Ai(Qi), denoted
Ai(Qi), is the set of directions of net trades from S2 i along which
ui does not decrease and is the same b' Sk i E RN . This condition is
automatically satisfied by preferences which admit a representation by
' The global cone A; and its closure A; (i .e . the smallest closed set containing A ;) are
different in general from the "recession cone" used by Rockafellar (1970) and others, e.g .
Werner (1987) . For example, with Leontief-type preferences the recession cone is the closed
upper contour of the preference while the global cone A ; is an open set . Furthermore when a
preference in RN has several directions to which the indifferences asymptote, then the
recession cone is different also from the closed set A;, see e.g . Proposition 2 in Chichilnisky
(1995a) . For examples see Proposition 2 in Chichilnisky (1995a) .
© Blackwell Publishers Ltd . 1996
concave utilities, or by smooth utilities with gradients bounded away
from zero .8 It is used to prove the necessity of limited arbitrage for
the existence of an equilibrium and the core ;
no flats : preferences contain no half-lines in their indifference
surfaces, a condition which is automatically satisfied by strictly
convex preferences . 9
Under assumptions (1) (2) and (3), the boundary of the global cone,
aAi, is non-empty and it consists of those directions along which the
utility increases strictly and asymptotically approaches but never reaches
a
	
maximum. A competitive equilibrium is a price p* E III' and
an allocation (x, , . . ., XH) E XH : Ei(x* - S2;) = 0 and d i ui(x*) _
Max (ui(xi)) over the set {xi : (p* , x; - Qi) = 0} . An allocation
(xi , . . ., x*,) E XH is in the core if Ei(x* - Q i ) = 0 and - 3N C 1,
. . . , H and yi, iEN : EiEN(yl - 52 ;) = 0, d i E N, u i(yi) % u i(x*) and
3 h E N s.t . uh(yh) > uh(xh ) . The trader s market cone Di is the set of
all those prices at which all trading opportunities in A; are unaffordable :
Di = { p E RN : dy E A,, (p, y) > 01 .
Definition 1 . The market economy E has limited arbitrage when all its
market cones intersect:
HnDi ~ .
i=1
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This means that there exists one price, the same for all traders, at
which the trades they can afford only increase their utilities by limited, or
bounded, amounts. The geometry of limited arbitrage is simple : it means
that the traders global cones cannot contain net trades which add up to
zero : With two traders : - 3 x, y such that x + y = 0, x EA I and y E A2. In
other words: the cones Ai must lie on one side of a given price
hyperplane. Figure 1 illustrates an economy El with two traders and two
assets which has limited arbitrage . Its cones are A, and A2 and the price
line p leaves both cones on one side . Therefore net trades in directions
which lead to unbounded utility gains are unaffordable by all traders from
their initial endowments at price p. The economy of Figure 2 does not
7 For a proof see Chichilnisky (1995b) .
8 For a proof see Chichilnisky (1992, 1995a).
9 Without the condition that preferences contain no half lines the arguments provided in this
paper do not hold . This condition includes all strictly concave preferences, but it excludes
linear preferences, preferences which are partly linear and many preferences which are
convex but not strictly so .
© Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1996
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Figure 1: Limited arbitrage is satisfied. The two global cones lie in the halfspace defined by
p . There are no .feasible trades that increase utilities without limit : these would consist of
pairs ofpoints symmetrically placed about the common initial endowment, and such pairs of
points lead to utility values below those of the endowments at a bounded distance,fiom the
initial endowments.
satisfy limited arbitrage: there are two directions of net trades wl E A l
and w l E A2 , which yield unbounded increases in utility and which sum
up to zero . Therefore, there is no price p at which all net trades in A 1
and in A2 are unaffordable from initial endowments .
3. LIMITED ARBITRAGE, COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM AND THE CORE
Well defined economies may have no competitive equilibrium. Examples of
such failure in Arrow Debreu economies with convex and monotone
© Blackwell Publishers Ltd . 1996
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Figure 2: Limited arbitrage does not hold. The global cones are not contained in a half
space, and there are sequences offeasible allocations such as (WI, W,), (W2, W2) which
produce unbounded utilities .
preferences were provided in Arrow and Hahn (1970) . They trace this
problem to the discontinuity of the excess demand when prices tend to zero
and when some trader has a zero endowment of some good, a situation
which they consider realistic . This problem is idiosyncratic to economies
without short sales.
Here we specialize, instead, in economies with short sales. The problem
of the lack of a competitive equilibrium is somewhat different. It is traced
to the desire of traders to take arbitrarily long and short positions which
272
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cannot be accommodated within the bounded resources of the economy. 1 °
Such unbounded trading positions may correspond to bounded but
nevertheless ever increasing utility increases . Under these conditions,
traders never reach an optimal trading position and a competitive
equilibrium with short sales typically fails to exist .
This section proves that one condition on endowments and prefer-
ences-limited arbitrage-is necessary and sufficient for the existence of
an equilibrium and the non emptiness of the core . Limited arbitrage
ensures that there exist prices at which no trader wishes, and none can
afford, to take positions which exceed the resources available in the
economy. Not only is this condition sufficient for the existence of an
equilibrium : it is also the minimal condition that will work, because
limited arbitrage is also necessary for the existence of an equilibrium .
The results provided below summarize the main results of a larger and
more complex literature, specializing them to cases in which short and
simple proofs can be provided . The first proof of a condition which is
simultaneously necessary and sufficient for the existence of a competitive
equilibrium-limited arbitrage-was given in Chichilnisky (1991, 1992);
it applies very generally to economies with or without short sales, having
preferences with or without flats, see Chichilnisky and Chichilnisky
(1991, 1995b), and with finitely or infinitely many markets, see
Chichilnisky and Heal (1991) . The first sufficient condition for the
existence of a competitive equilibrium in Arrow Debreu-type economies
with short sales (with finitely or infinitely many markets) was given in
Chichilnisky and Heal (1984) ; subsequent related literature is discussed
also in Section 4. 11
Theorem 3.1 . Limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for the
existence of a competitive equilibrium in the economy E, for any set of
initial endowments IQi}i_1, . . .,H E RNxH,
Proof. Necessity first . The proof is by contradiction . Without loss of
generality assume that `d i, Q i = 0. If p* is an equilibrium price, then
di, xi E Ai ==> (p * , xi) > 0, for otherwise there would exist affordable
'° When the indifference surfaces of the preferences have a closed -set of gradient directions
(for example when preferences are linear) then an economy fails to have a competitive
equilibrium when it has the resources to accomplish indefinitely large increases in utility,
since there are at least two traders who are willing and able to make indefinitely large utility
increasing exchanges .
' ' In temporary equilibrium models, which differ from Arrow-Debreu economies in that
forward markets are missing, Green (1973) stated conditions on price expectations as
necessary and sufficient for the existence of a temporary equilibrium .
Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1996
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consumption bundles whose utility exceeds any other utility level, and
therefore an equilibrium cannot exist . Next I will prove that Vi,
xi E aA i ==~- (p* , xi ) > 0 . By contradiction . Assume that x; E aAi satisfies
(p* , xi) , 0, and let yi be the equilibrium consumption vector for trader i .
Now consider the vector (yi + Axi), where A > 1 . Since (p* , yi) , 0 and
(Ap* , xi) = (p* , Axi) , 0, then (p* , Yi + Axi) = (p* , yi) + (Ap
*
r xi) - 0, so
that yi + A.xi is affordable . Moreover, by assumption (2) on uniformity of
the cones, since the vector x; E aAi , ui(yi + Axi) > ui(yi), contradicting the
fact that y i is an equilibrium allocation . Since the contradiction arises from
assuming that 11 i, x i s .t . xi E aAi and (p* , xi ) - 0, it follows that `d i,
x i E aA i = (p * , xi) > 0 . Therefore I have shown that Vi, x i E Ai =
(p*, xi ) > 0, so that limited arbitrage is indeed necessary for existence .
Sufficiency : in the special case considered here, namely when X= R' and
when the preferences satisfy conditions (1) to (3), known proofs of
existence apply : for example, Theorem 1 of Chichilnisky and Heal (1984,
1993), and the subsequent results 12 of Werner (1987), Nielsen (1989), and
Page (1987) .
Intuitively Theorem 3 .1 is a reasonable result : in an economy without
limited arbitrage, such as that in Figure 2, traders wish to take
unboundedly large and opposed trading positions, and cannot reach an
equilibrium. Desired trades are just too diverse to be accommodated
within the same economy. As a corollary of Theorem 3 .1 one obtains :
Theorem 3 .2 . Limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient .for the non-
emptiness of the core in the economy E, for any set of initial endowments
1 N.H
fi=1, . . ., HR
Proof. Since a competitive equilibrium is in the core, the sufficiency of
limited arbitrage follows directly from Theorem 3 .1 . Necessity : a core
allocation is Pareto efficient, and it is therefore a competitive equilibrium
for some initial endowments : this is the second welfare theorem . For these
initial endowments, therefore, Theorem 3 .1 implies that limited arbitrage
must be satisfied . But limited arbitrage is satisfied simultaneously at all
initial endowments, because of the uniformity assumption (2) . Therefore
limited arbitrage is satisfied at the original initial endowments as well .
Therefore limited arbitrage is necessary for the existence of a core
allocation .
12 The proofs of existence of an equilibrium in Chichilnisky (1992, 1995a) include also
more general economies : markets with as well as without short sales, preferences which may
or may not be strictly convex, and finitely or infinitely many markets .
© Blackwell Publishers Ltd . 1996
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4 . SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR EXISTENCE OF AN EQUILIBRIUM WITH
SHORT SALES
In Theorem 1 we invoked prior results which provided sufficient conditions
for the existence of an equilibrium in Arrow Debreu markets with short
sales. This section shows the connection between different results .
4.1 The literature
In 1984 Chichilnisky and Heal (1984, 1993) defined a no-arbitrage
condition C, and proved that it is sufficient for the existence of an Arrow
Debreu equilibrium in economies with or without short sales, with finitely
or infinitely many markets, and with preferences which are or are not
strictly convex. Subsequently, in Arrow Debreu economies with strictly
convex preferences and with finitely many markets, sufficient conditions
for the existence of a competitive equilibrium with short sales l3 were given
by Werner (1987) and then by Nielsen (1989) . In the context of Hart's
model which does not have the generality of the Arrow Debreu market
considered here, in Chichilnisky and Heal (1984, 1993) and in Werner
(1987), Page (1987) uses the same cones and the same no-arbitrage
condition defined earlier by Werner (1987) to state existence results .
The results of Chichilnisky and Heal (1984, 1993) are prior and more
general than the rest : their paper was submitted for publication on
February 28, 1984 at least a year and a half earlier than the rest, as
recorded in the printed versions . Proposition 4 .2 shows that the results of
Chichilnisky and Heal (1984, 1993) are more general than those of
Werner (1987), which were submitted for publication in July 1985, as
well as those published later in Nielsen (1989) . The subsequent results of
Page (1987) are less general than those of Chichilnisky and Heal (1984,
13 In the particular case covered in this paper, which excludes the Arrow-Debreu model in
its classic form (because it admits short sales) and which excludes also the case of
preferences which may have flats and may have non-uniform recession cones, Werner (1987)
provided a proof of sufficiency and stated, without proof, that the condition which he calls
no-arbitrage is necessary for existence . The argument which Werner (1987) provides for
necessity is not complete . The point is that the no-arbitrage condition in his Theorem 1 is
defined in terms of the sets S; : it is n;S% :f 0, while the hint he gives for necessity after the
proof of sufficiency is stated, instead, in terms of sets D; : it is n;D; t 0. A proof that
S; = D; is needed, but the one provided in the Proposition 2 assumes that all sets W; are the
same (see last three lines of (i) in the Proof of Proposition 2, p . 1410), while the assumption
made in the paper is, instead, that all recession cones R; are the same, see Assumption 3, on
page 1408 . However, R ; 0 W;, see p . 1408, two lines above Assumption 3 . Therefore there is
no proof of necessity in Werner (1987) .
` Blackwell Publishers Ltd . 1996
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1993), since they apply only to Hart's model . In addition, Chichilnisky
and Heal (1984, 1993) has a much larger domain: it applies to finite or
infinite dimensional economies, and to preferences which may or may not
be strictly convex, while the other three papers are finite dimensional, and
apply only to strictly convex preferences .
In the following I restrict the discussion to the finite dimensional case
with strictly convex preferences to facilitate the comparison .
4.2 Different no-arbitrage conditions
The main problem for the existence of an equilibrium with short sales is
that the set of feasible allocations is unbounded . This can lead traders to
take arbitrarily long and short positions, and to the possible loss of
equilibrium . To control this problem, Chichilnisky and Heal (1984, 1993)
observed that, although feasible allocations are unbounded, individually
rational feasible allocations may define a bounded set . Intuitively this
happens when certain traders are relatively more risk averse than others,
and wish to avoid very short or long positions ; under these conditions
Chichilnisky and Heal (1984, 1993) proves the existence of an equilibrium .
They formalized this by requiring :
No-arbitrage Condition C (Chichilnisky and Heal (1984, 1993)) : If along a
sequence of feasible allocations some trader's allocation grows without bound,
then the utility of some other trader's eventually drops below the level of his/her
initial endowment.
Subsequently, Werner (1987) and Nielsen (1989) required a no-arbitrage
condition, the same in both papers, which they proved to be sufficient for
the existence of an equilibrium . Within finite dimensional economies with
strictly convex preferences they required :
No-arbitrage condition (*): There exists a price p such that (p*, xi) > 0
dx c Ri for i = 1, 2, . . ., H.
In this definition Ri is trader ith s recession cone, Ri = {x E RN :
ui (Q i + Ax) % ui(Q i) for all A > 0} ; this cone was used by Rockafellar
(1970) and subsequently by Werner (1987), Page (1987) and Nielsen
(1989) . In order to compare the results it is useful to compare the families
of cones used in the different concepts .
© Blackwell Publishers Ltd . 1996
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4.3 Global cones and recession cones
Example 1 . The recession cone Ri is generally different from the global
cone Ai, see also Chichilnisky (1995a). For example with Leontief
preferences the global cone A i is the open positive orthant, while the
recession cone is . the closed orthant, namely the closed upper contour of
the preference .
Example 2. The recession cone Ri is also generally different _from the
closure of the global cone Ai . For example, in Figure 3 below there is a _fan
of different directions each of which becomes eventually a subset of a
different indifference surface. Each of these directions belongs to the
recession cone Ri. On the other hand, the closure of' the global cone
includes only one such direction .
Example 3 . Under the special assumptions of this paper (1), (2) and (3),
Ri = Ai . This is because, under these assumptions, there is only one utility
cD Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1996
Figure 3
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value associated to directions in the boundary of the global cone, aA i , and
therefore the type of examples provided above cannot occur. For a proof of
this, see Proposition 2 of Chichilnisky (1995a) .
Since in our case R i = A i , one has :
Proposition 4.1 . Under assumptions (1), (2) and (3), limited arbitrage
coincides with the no-arbitrage condition (*) .
This proposition does not hold when the closure of the global cone Ai
is different from the recession cone R i , see e .g . Chichilnisky (1995a) .
4.4 Existence of equilibrium with short sales and the no-arbitrage
condition C
The following result establishes that the results on the existence of an
equilibrium with short sales of Chichilnisky and Heal (1984, 1993) contain
the results of Werner (1987) and Nielsen (1989) as special cases . It does so
by establishing that the no-arbitrage condition C of Chichilnisky and Heal
(1984, 1993) is weaker than (*) and than limited arbitrage when
preferences are strictly convex.
Proposition 4.2 . The no-arbitrage condition C is weaker than limited
arbitrage and than no-arbitrage condition (*) when preferences satisfy (1),
(2) and (3) . In particular, the earlier results on the existence of a
competitive equilibrium in economies with short sales of Chichilnisky and
Heal (1984, 1993) contain as special cases those of Werner (1987) and
Nielsen (1989) .
Proof. The proof is by contradiction . Assume that the no-arbitrage
condition (*) is satisfied but the set of individually rational feasible
allocations is not bounded, then there exists a sequence of allocations
denoted x.~-1, z, . . . where x = x , . . ., X'I E f~NXH such that Vj,~H I (x, - Qi) = 0, for all i, ui(x ;) > ui(Qj) and, for some i, lim; x; = oc.
Let J be the set of traders for which the norms of the allocations are
unbounded : i E J<=> limjjjx ;jj = oc. Since EH I(xi - Sk i ) = 0, there must
exist at least two traders in J. For each i E J consider a convergent
subsequence of the sequence of normalized vectors x;/Ilx ;ll, and use the
same notation for the subsequence . Now observe that when preferences ui
have no flats, assumption (3), a ray defined by a vector v starting from Q i ,
Blackwell Publishers Ltd . 1996
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is either in Ai (which is not empty by assumption (1)) and therefore ui is
always strictly increasing along this ray, or else v E A', the complement of
Ai, and ui eventually decreases below the level achieved at { Qi } . This
implies that b' i E J, . x ; =1im; x,/jjx;jjE A i , because by assumption
limb x; = oc and ui(x i ) % u;(Q,) : since lim;jjxj jj = oc, if x; 0 Ai , then
lim; ui(x;) < ui(Qi), which is a contradiction . -
Let G = 1, 2, . . ., H - J be the complement of the set J. By definition,
lim Ei,G(x; .- Q i) = M < 0, oo, and by construction limb EiEJ(xe - S2;) +
limb EiGG(x; - S2 i ) = HM EiEJ(x; - Qi) + M = 0, so that I'M EiEJ(xt -
S2 i - M/#J) = 0, where #J is the cardinality of the set J Observe that by
assumption (2) of uniformity, since
M
xi
- ~' Jlim II ' II E A i	then zi = lim M E A iforall i.x; x; SZi
- #J
Consider now the cone in R' defined by all strictly positive linear
combinations of the vectors zi, iEJ . Such a cone must either be contained
strictly in a half-space of R', or must equal a whole subspace of R' .
Since lim; EiEJ(xr - Qi) + M = 0 this implies that the strictly positive
combination of the vectors zi, iEJ cannot be contained strictly in a half-
space of R', therefore they must define a subspace of R^' . In particular,
for some j E J they must contain the vector -z;, i .e .
iEJ
Aizi = -z;, for some Ai > 0, where zi E A i	(1)
But the no-arbitrage condition (*) requires that I p EnHDi and, in
particular, that b'zi E Ai, (p, zi) > 0, which contradicts (1) . Since the
contradiction arose from assuming that the set of feasible and individually
rational allocations is not bounded, the set of such allocations must be
bounded . Therefore the no-arbitrage (*) implies the no-arbitrage condition
C, as we wished to prove .
Remark 1 . Under the assumptions of this paper (1), (2) and (3), the 1984
no-arbitrage Condition C of Chichilnisky and Heal (1984, 1993) is
necessary and sufficient for the existence of a competitive equilibrium and
the nonemptiness of the core in economies with short sales .
Proof. This follows directly from Theorem 3 .1 and Proposition 4.2 .
Condition C is sufficient for the existence of an equilibrium by Theorem 1
CC) Blackwell Publishers Ltd . 1996
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of Chichilnisky and Heal (1984, 1993). Necessity is established as follows .
Limited arbitrage is necessary for the existence of an equilibrium by
Theorem 3 .1 . Therefore, if an equilibrium exists, limited arbitrage must be
satisfied . By Proposition 4.2 limited arbitrage implies the no-arbitrage
Condition C. Therefore Condition C is satisfied when an equilibrium exists :
i.e . Condition C is necessary for existence. The result on the core follows
directly from Theorem 3 .2 .
Observe that Proposition 4 .1 does not hold when assumption (3) is not
satisfied, i .e . when preferences have flats :
Remark 2. Limited arbitrage does not imply that the individually rational
feasible allocations form a bounded set when preferences have 'flats ". In
particular, limited arbitrage does not imply Condition (C) in this context.
Consider two identical linear preferences in R2 . Limited arbitrage is
satisfied because the two preferences are identical. However, Condition C
is not, because the set of individually rational feasible allocations is
unbounded.
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